Co-Subjective Consciousness Constitutes Collectives

Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1):137-160 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this paper I want to introduce and defend what I call the "subject mode account" of collective intentionality. I propose to understand collectives from joint attention dyads over small informal groups of various types to organizations, institutions and political entities such as nation states, in terms of their self-awareness. On the subject mode account, the self-consciousness of such collectives is constitutive for their being. More precisely, their self-representation as subjects of joint theoretical and practical positions towards the world – rather than as objects of such positions – makes them what they are. Members of such collectives represent each other as co-subjects of such positions and thus represent the world from the point of view of the collective.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SCHCCC-7
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-05-16
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.Peacocke, Christopher & Searle, John R.

View all 25 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-04-11

Total views
20 ( #35,986 of 39,000 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #30,114 of 39,000 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.