Democratic Values: A Better Foundation for Public Trust in Science

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
There is a growing consensus among philosophers of science that core parts of the scientific process involve non-epistemic values. This undermines the traditional foundation for public trust in science. In this article I consider two proposals for justifying public trust in value-laden science. According to the first, scientists can promote trust by being transparent about their value choices. On the second, trust requires that the values of a scientist align with the values of an individual member of the public. I argue that neither of these proposals work and suggest an alternative that does better. When scientists must appeal to values in the course of their research, they should appeal to democratic values: the values of the public or its representatives.
Reprint years
2018, 2021
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SCHDVA-5
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-07-01
View other versions
Added to PP index
2018-07-25

Total views
385 ( #17,438 of 64,206 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
64 ( #11,176 of 64,206 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.