Does Visual Spatial Awareness Require the Visual Awareness of Space?
Mind and Language 27 (3):308-329 (2012)
Abstract
Many philosophers have held that it is not possible to experience a spatial object, property, or relation except against the background of an intact awareness of a space that is somehow ‘absolute’. This paper challenges that claim, by analyzing in detail the case of a brain-damaged subject whose visual experiences seem to have violated this condition: spatial objects and properties were present in his visual experience, but space itself was not. I go on to suggest that phenomenological argumentation can give us a kind of evidence about the nature of the mind even if this evidence is not absolutely incorrigible
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2011-06-21
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2011-06-21
Total views
1,384 ( #3,538 of 69,147 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
62 ( #12,570 of 69,147 )
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