Does Visual Spatial Awareness Require the Visual Awareness of Space?

Mind and Language 27 (3):308-329 (2012)
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Abstract

Many philosophers have held that it is not possible to experience a spatial object, property, or relation except against the background of an intact awareness of a space that is somehow ‘absolute’. This paper challenges that claim, by analyzing in detail the case of a brain-damaged subject whose visual experiences seem to have violated this condition: spatial objects and properties were present in his visual experience, but space itself was not. I go on to suggest that phenomenological argumentation can give us a kind of evidence about the nature of the mind even if this evidence is not absolutely incorrigible

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John Schwenkler
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

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