Hybrid Expressivism: Virtues and Vices

Ethics 119 (2):257-309 (2009)
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Abstract

This paper is a survey of recent ‘hybrid’ approaches to metaethics, according to which moral sentences, in some sense or other, express both beliefs and desires. I try to show what kinds of theoretical issues come up at the different choice points we encounter in developing such a view, to raise some problems and explain where they come from, and to begin to get a sense for what the payoff of such views can be, and what they will need to do in order to earn that payoff.

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Mark Schroeder
University of Southern California

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