Imperfect Duties, Group Obligations, and Beneficence
Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (5):557-584 (2014)
Abstract
There is virtually no philosophical consensus on what, exactly, imperfect duties are. In this paper, I lay out three criteria which I argue any adequate account of imperfect duties should satisfy. Using beneficence as a leading example, I suggest that existing accounts of imperfect duties will have trouble meeting those criteria. I then propose a new approach: thinking of imperfect duties as duties held by groups, rather than individuals. I show, again using the example of beneficence, that this proposal can satisfy the criteria, explaining how something can both have the necessity characteristic of duty, while also allowing agents the latitude which seems to attach to imperfect duties.
Keywords
Categories
(categorize this paper)
Reprint years
2014
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SCHIDG-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View upload history
View upload history

No references found.

The Duty to Object.Lackey, Jennifer
Weeding Out Flawed Versions of Shareholder Primacy: A Reflection on the Moral Obligations That Carry Over From Principals to Agents.Mejia, Santiago
Gemeinsame Hilfspflichten, Weltarmut und kumulative Handlungen.Schwenkenbecher, Anne
Added to PP index
2013-06-24
Total views
718 ( #3,812 of 44,295 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
110 ( #4,548 of 44,295 )
2013-06-24
Total views
718 ( #3,812 of 44,295 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
110 ( #4,548 of 44,295 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.