Is Hume attempting to introduce a new, pragmatic conception of a contradiction in his Treatise?

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 20 (3):315-323 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Hume’s Treatise, with its celebrated bundle theory of the self, is a significant contribution to the embryonic Newtonian experimental philosophy of the enlightenment. But the theory is inadequate as it stands, as the appendix to the Treatise makes clear. For this account of the self, apparently, rests on contradictory principles — propositions, fortunately, that can be reconciled, according to Hume. My paper is a critical exploration of Hume’s argument for this intriguing suggestion.

Author's Profile

Alan Schwerin
Rice University (PhD)

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-03-24

Downloads
901 (#18,705)

6 months
123 (#48,131)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?