Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism

Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340 (2018)
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Abstract
We argue that intentions are beliefs—beliefs that are held in light of, and made rational by, practical reasoning. To intend to do something is neither more nor less than to believe, on the basis of one’s practical reasoning, that one will do it. The identification of the mental state of intention with the mental state of belief is what we call strong cognitivism about intentions. It is a strong form of cognitivism because we identify intentions with beliefs, rather than maintaining that beliefs are entailed by intentions or are components of them.
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First archival date: 2017-11-18
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