Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism

Mind 127 (507):863-879 (2018)
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Abstract
Epistemic Permissivists face a special problem about the relationship between our first- and higher-order attitudes. They claim that rationality often permits a range of doxastic responses to the evidence. Given plausible assumptions about the relationship between your first- and higher-order attitudes, it can't be rational to adopt a credence on the edge of that range. But Permissivism says that, for some such range, any credence in that range is rational. Permissivism, in its traditional form, cannot be right. I consider some new ways of developing Permissivism to avoid this argument, but each has problems of its own.
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First archival date: 2016-11-03
Latest version: 2 (2016-11-03)
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References found in this work BETA
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
Epistemic Akrasia.Horowitz, Sophie
Knowledge and Its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

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Citations of this work BETA
Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Jackson, Elizabeth & Turnbull, Margaret Greta

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2016-10-27

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