Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity

Noûs 53 (1):114-133 (2019)
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Abstract

I argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. The mental activity in question is the activity of employing perceptual capacities, such as discriminatory, selective capacities. This is a radical view, but I hope to make it plausible. In arguing for this mental activist view, I reject orthodox views on which perceptual consciousness is analyzed in terms of peculiar entities, such as, phenomenal properties, external mind-independent properties, propositions, sense-data, qualia, or intentional objects.

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Susanna Schellenberg
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

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