Practical Knowledge

Was Sollen Wir Glauben? Was Dürfen Wir Tun?, Sektionsbeiträge der GAP. 8 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
The contribution deals with knowledge of what to do, and how, where, when and why to do it, as it is found in a multitude of plans, rules, procedures, maxims, and other instructions. It is argued that while this knowledge is conceptual and propositional, it is still irreducible to theoretical knowledge of what is the case and why it is the case. It is knowledge of goals, of ends and means, rather than of facts. It is knowledge-to that is irreducibly practical in having world to mind direction of fit and the essential function of guiding as yet uncompleted action. While practical knowledge is fundamentally different from theoretical knowledge in terms of mind-world relations, the practical and theoretical domains are still parallel in terms of justificatory and inferential relations, they are like mirror images of one another. It is shown that if this view of practical knowledge is accepted, convincing Gettier cases for practical knowledge can be constructed. An extensive analysis of these cases demonstrates the usefulness of the notions of practical deduction, abduction, and induction.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-05-19
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Knowing How.Stanley, Jason & Williamson, Timothy
Knowing.Stanley, Jason
Intention.Heath, P. L. & Anscombe, G. E. M.
Intentionality.Searle, J. R.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
32 ( #37,517 of 42,290 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #34,037 of 42,290 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.