Rationality and Responsibility

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Abstract
Broome takes himself and his opponents to be concerned with the ordinary use of 'ra-tional'. I argue that this is at best misleading. For the object of current theories of rationality is determined by a specific use of 'rational' that is intimately connected to blame and praise. I call the property it refers to 'rationalityRESP'. This focus on rationalityRESP, I argue, has two significant implications for Broome's critique of theories of rationality as reasons-responsiveness. First, ra-tionalityRESP is plausibly conceived of as a kind of reasons-responsiveness. Secondly, Broome's dispute with internalists about normativity as well as his dispute with externalists about rationality both hinge on questions regarding the concept of responsibility. I conclude that philosophers should integrate discussions about responsibility in their debates about rationality.
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SCHRAR-30
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Archival date: 2020-05-18
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2020-05-18

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