Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge

Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Several authors have recently endorsed the thesis that there is what has been called pragmatic encroachment on knowledge—in other words, that two people who are in the same situation with respect to truth-related factors may differ in whether they know something, due to a difference in their practical circumstances. This paper aims not to defend this thesis, but to explore how it could be true. What I aim to do, is to show how practical factors could play a role in defeating knowledge by defeating epistemic rationality—the very kind of rationality that is entailed by knowledge, and in which Pascalian considerations do not play any role—even though epistemic rationality consists in having adequate evidence.

Author's Profile

Mark Schroeder
University of Southern California


Added to PP

80 (#91,678)

6 months
599 (#2,263)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?