The Epistemology of Modest Atheism

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Distinguishing between the old atheism, the new atheism, and modest atheism, and also between belief and acceptance, and belief and acceptance tokens and types, I defend the disjunctive view that either modest atheistic belief or modest atheistic acceptance, construed as type, is today epistemically justified in the context of philosophical inquiry. Central to my defence is a deductive version of the hiddenness argument and an emphasis on the early stage of philosophical inquiry that we presently occupy.
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First archival date: 2018-03-14
Latest version: 2 (2018-03-14)
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[Handout 12].Mackie, J. L.
.Swinburne, R. G.
Diagnosing Bias in Philosophy of Religion.Draper, Paul & Nichols, Ryan
Divine Hiddenness and the Nature of Belief.Poston, Ted & Dougherty, Trent

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