The Goldilocks Problem of the specificity of visual phenomenal content

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):476-495 (2014)
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Abstract
Existentialist accounts maintain that visual phenomenal content takes the logical form of an existentially quantified sentence. These accounts do not make phenomenal content specific enough. Singularist accounts posit a singular content in which the seen object is a constituent. These accounts make phenomenal content too specific. My account gets the specificity of visual phenomenal content just right. My account begins with John Searle's suggestion that visual experience represents an object as seen, moves this relation outside the scope of the existential quantifier and then replaces it with the relation of objects being ‘present as accessible’, as described by Alva Noë
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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The Silence of the Senses.Travis, Charles S.
The Limits of Self-Awareness.Martin, Michael G. F.

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2014-10-19

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