The objects of bodily awareness

Philosophical Studies 162 (2):465-472 (2013)
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Abstract
Is it possible to misidentify the object of an episode of bodily awareness? I argue that it is, on the grounds that a person can reasonably be unsure or mistaken as to which part of his or her body he or she is aware of at a given moment. This requires discussing the phenomenon of body ownership, and defending the claim that the proper parts of one’s body are at least no less ‘principal’ among the objects of bodily awareness than is the body as a whole. I conclude with some reasons why this should lead us to think that bodily awareness, unlike introspection, is a form of perception.
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SCHTOO-13
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 2 (2015-11-21)
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First-Person Thought.Morgan, Daniel & Salje, Léa
Multisensory Consciousness and Synesthesia.Brogaard, Berit & Chudnoff, Elijah

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