The Swapping Constraint

Minds and Machines 28 (3):605-622 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Triviality arguments against the computational theory of mind claim that computational implementation is trivial and thus does not serve as an adequate metaphysical basis for mental states. It is common to take computational implementation to consist in a mapping from physical states to abstract computational states. In this paper, I propose a novel constraint on the kinds of physical states that can implement computational states, which helps to specify what it is for two physical states to non-trivially implement the same computational state.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-08-20
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Defining 'Intrinsic'.Langton, Rae & Lewis, David

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
112 ( #28,790 of 46,328 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #30,869 of 46,328 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.