The Swapping Constraint

Minds and Machines 28 (3):605-622 (2018)
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Abstract

Triviality arguments against the computational theory of mind claim that computational implementation is trivial and thus does not serve as an adequate metaphysical basis for mental states. It is common to take computational implementation to consist in a mapping from physical states to abstract computational states. In this paper, I propose a novel constraint on the kinds of physical states that can implement computational states, which helps to specify what it is for two physical states to non-trivially implement the same computational state.

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Henry Ian Schiller
University of Sheffield

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