Score-keeping in virtue-games: A contextualist strategy of theory-selection in meta-philosophy

Abstract

Let us denote by ‘methodological normativism’ the thesis that part of the business of philosophical methodology consists in examining or influencing norms understood to determine, at any given time, methods actually used in philosophy. For the value of methodological normativism to be adequately recognized, there should exist a relatively standard “system” in which one evaluates competing views on how, and why, philosophical methods may be reformed. No such system appears to be standardly recognized, and the consequence is an unpalatable prolongation of debates on norms philosophers, as a matter of fact, follow in implementing philosophical methods. I will seek to develop, in what follows, a contextualist principle of arbitrating competing methodological proposals in meta-philosophy using insights well-entrenched in meta-metaphysics. In other words, I seek to discuss a possible way, af f orded by meta-metaphysics, of systematizing methodological normativism.

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