Can Informational Theories Account for Metarepresentation?

Topoi 39 (1):81-94 (2020)
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Abstract

In this essay we discuss recent attempts to analyse the notion of representation, as it is employed in cognitive science, in purely informational terms. In particular, we argue that recent informational theories cannot accommodate the existence of metarepresentations. Since metarepresentations play a central role in the explanation of many cognitive abilities, this is a serious shortcoming of these proposals.

Author Profiles

Miguel Angel Sebastian
National Autonomous University of Mexico
Marc Artiga
Universitat De València

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