Can Informational Theories Account for Metarepresentation?

Topoi 39 (1):81-94 (2020)
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Abstract
In this essay we discuss recent attempts to analyse the notion of representation, as it is employed in cognitive science, in purely informational terms. In particular, we argue that recent informational theories cannot accommodate the existence of metarepresentations. Since metarepresentations play a central role in the explanation of many cognitive abilities, this is a serious shortcoming of these proposals.
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Archival date: 2019-11-02
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Functional Analysis.Cummins, Robert

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Informational Theories of Content and Mental Representation.Artiga, Marc & Sebastián, Miguel Ángel

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2017-10-21

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