On the incoherence of molinism: incompatibility of middle knowledge with divine immutability

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 96 (1):23-34 (2024)
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Abstract

We argue that there is an incompatibility between the two basic principles of Molinism, i.e., God’s middle knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, and divine immutability. To this end, firstly, we set out the difference between strong and weak immutability: according to the latter only God’s essential attributes remain unchanged, while the former affirms that God cannot change in any way. Our next step is to argue that Molinism ascribes strong immutability to God. However, according to Molinism, some counterfactuals of freedom need to be actualized by divine will. We argue that this claim does entail a change in God because it attributes a knowledge to God that involves moving from possibility to actuality through divine will. Therefore, claiming God knows counterfactuals of freedom leads us to reject the strong sense of divine immutability. Further, we argue that assuming God’s knowledge encompasses counterfactuals of freedom cannot be consistent even with weak immutability because, according to Molinism, a change in God’s knowledge requires a change in His essence. We conclude that Molinism is incoherent.

Author Profiles

Ebrahim Azadegan
Sharif University Of Technology
Mahdi Esfahani
Freie Universität Berlin
Farid al-Din Sebt
Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies - IHCS

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