Ecological psychology is radical enough. A reply to radical enactivists

Philosophical Psychology (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Ecological psychology is one of the most influential theories of perception in the embodied, anti-representational, and situated cognitive sciences. However, radical enactivists claim that Gibsonians tend to describe ecological information and its ‘pick up’ in ways that make ecological psychology close to representational theories of perception and cognition (Myin 2016; Hutto 2017; Hutto and Myin 2017; see also van Dijk et al. 2015). Motivated by worries about the tenability of classical views of informational content and its processing, these authors claim that ecological psychology needs to be “RECtified” so as to explicitly resist representational readings. In this paper, we argue against this call for RECtification. To do so, we offer a detailed analysis of the notion of perceptual information, and other related notions such as specificity and meaning, as they are presented in the specialized ecological literature. We defend that these notions, if properly understood, remain free of any representational commitment. Ecological psychology, we conclude, does not need to be RECtified.
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Archival date: 2019-03-05
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The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience.Varela, Francisco; Thompson, Evan & Rosch, Eleanor

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