Between the Actual and the Trivial World

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The subject of this paper is the notion of similarity between the actual and impossible worlds. Many believe that this notion is governed by two rules. Ac-cording to the first rule, every non-trivial world is more similar to the actual world than the trivial world is. The second rule states that every possible world is more similar to the actual world than any impossible world is. The aim of this paper is to challenge both of these rules. We argue that acceptance of the first rule leads to the claim that the rule ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet is invalid in classical logic. The second rule does not recognize the fact that objects might be similar to one an-other due to various features.
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Archival date: 2016-04-20
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A Theory of Conditionals.Stalnaker, Robert C.
Impossible Worlds.Berto, Francesco

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