Dwa typy abstrakcjonizmu w ontologii fikcji

Przegląd Filozoficzno-Literacki (forthcoming)
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"The main aim of the paper is to compare two types of abstractionistic accounts of fictional objects, and to analyze their consequences for interpretation of existential quantification. According to a proponent of general abstractionistic theory, fictional objects have abstract nature in a way similar to contracts, marriages, and the likes. This view is an alternative to strongly realistic accounts of fictional objects, defended by Terence Parsons or David Lewis. Within abstractionistic theories, as in all philosophical areas, one can find divergences of opinions. The main differences between two of them – Peter van Inwagen's and Edward Zalta's – are connected with the interpretation of existential quantification. According to van Inwagen, “being” is the same as “existence” and its sense is captured by the existential quantifier. Edward Zalta's theory is much closer to the Meinongian Theory of Objects. He argues for the need of distinguishing between “being” and “existence” and for invoking nonexistent objects. Because of that he suggests an alternative interpretation of quantification. Admittedly, there is one abstractionistic source for both theories, but their ontological consequences are different - van Inwagen is a staunch opponent of nonexistent objects, and Zalta describes his own theory as "Meinongian"."

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Maciej Sendłak
University of Warsaw


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