A logical hole in the chinese room

Minds and Machines 19 (2):229-235 (2009)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Searle’s Chinese Room Argument (CRA) has been the object of great interest in the philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence and cognitive science since its initial presentation in ‘Minds, Brains and Programs’ in 1980. It is by no means an overstatement to assert that it has been a main focus of attention for philosophers and computer scientists of many stripes. It is then especially interesting to note that relatively little has been said about the detailed logic of the argument, whatever significance Searle intended CRA to have. The problem with the CRA is that it involves a very strong modal claim, the truth of which is both unproved and highly questionable. So it will be argued here that the CRA does not prove what it was intended to prove.
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SHAALH
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-07-17
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-06-15

Total views
496 ( #6,414 of 43,973 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
57 ( #12,180 of 43,973 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.