Brandom on the normativity of meaning

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):141-60 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Brandom's "inferentialism"—his theory that contentfulness consists in being governed by inferential norms—proves dubiously compatible with his own deflationary approach to intentional objectivity. This is because a deflationist argument, adapted from the case of truth to that of correct inference, undermines the criterion of adequacy Brandom employs in motivating inferentialism. Once that constraint is abandoned, moreover, the very constitutive-explanatory availability of Brandom's inferential norms becomes suspect. Yet Brandom intertwines inferentialism with a separate explanatory project, one that in explaining the pragmatic significance of meaning-attributions does yield a convincing construal of the claim that the concept of meaning is normative.

Author's Profile

Lionel Shapiro
University of Connecticut

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
132 (#85,384)

6 months
689 (#1,846)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?