Desire and What It’s Rational to Do

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
It is often taken for granted that our desires can contribute to what it is rational for us to do. This paper examines an account of desire—the ‘guise of the good’— that promises an explanation of this datum. I argue that extant guise-of-the-good accounts fail to provide an adequate explanation of how a class of desires—basic desires— contributes to practical rationality. I develop an alternative guise-of-the-good account on which basic desires attune us to our reasons for action in virtue of their biological function. This account emphasises the role of desire as part of our competence to recognise and respond to normative reasons.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SHADAW-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-10-22
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-10-22

Total views
425 ( #12,074 of 55,891 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
425 ( #773 of 55,891 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.