Explaining Evidence Denial as Motivated Pragmatically Rational Epistemic Irrationality

Metaphilosophy 50 (4):563-579 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper introduces a model for evidence denial that explains this behavior as a manifestation of rationality and it is based on the contention that social values (measurable as utilities) often underwrite these sorts of responses. Moreover, it is contended that the value associated with group membership in particular can override epistemic reason when the expected utility of a belief or belief system is great. However, it is also true that it appears to be the case that it is still possible for such unreasonable believers to reverse this sort of dogmatism and to change their beliefs in a way that is epistemically rational. The conjecture made here is that we should expect this to happen only when the expected utility of the beliefs in question dips below a threshold where the utility value of continued dogmatism and the associated group membership is no longer sufficient to motivate defusing the counter-evidence that tells against such epistemically irrational beliefs.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SHAEED
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-07-05
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions.Alchourrón, Carlos E.; Gärdenfors, Peter & Makinson, David
Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Kahneman, Daniel; Slovic, Paul & Tversky, Amos

View all 25 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2019-05-28

Total views
12 ( #40,294 of 40,765 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #32,139 of 40,765 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.