Foley’s Threshold View of Belief and the Safety Condition on Knowledge

Metaphilosophy 49 (4):589-594 (2018)
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Abstract
This paper introduces a new argument against Richard Foley’s threshold view of belief. His view is based on the Lockean Thesis (LT) and the Rational Threshold Thesis (RTT). The argument introduced here shows that the views derived from the LT and the RTT violate the safety condition on knowledge in way that threatens the LT and/or the RTT.
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2018
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SHAFTV-3
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Archival date: 2018-07-24
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Anti-Luck Epistemology.Pritchard, Duncan
Knowledge and Its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

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2018-01-29

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