Grounding Reichenbach’s Pragmatic Vindication of Induction

Polish Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):43-55 (2017)
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Abstract
This paper has three interdependent aims. The first is to make Reichenbach’s views on induction and probabilities clearer, especially as they pertain to his pragmatic justification of induction. The second aim is to show how his view of pragmatic justification arises out of his commitment to extensional empiricism and moots the possibility of a non-pragmatic justification of induction. Finally, and most importantly, a formal decision-theoretic account of Reichenbach’s pragmatic justification is offered in terms both of the minimax principle and the dominance principle.
Reprint years
2017
ISBN(s)
1897-1652
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SHAGRP
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-07-17
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2017-08-30

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