Logical Expressivism and Logical Relations

In Ondřej Beran, Vojtěch Kolman & Ladislav Koreň (eds.), From rules to meanings. New essays on inferentialism. New York: Routledge. pp. 179-95 (2018)
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According to traditional logical expressivism, logical operators allow speakers to explicitly endorse claims that are already implicitly endorsed in their discursive practice — endorsed in virtue of that practice’s having instituted certain logical relations. Here, I propose a different version of logical expressivism, according to which the expressive role of logical operators is explained without invoking logical relations at all, but instead in terms of the expression of discursive-practical attitudes. In defense of this alternative, I present a deflationary account of the expressive role of vocabulary by which we ascribe logical relations.
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Truth.Horwich, Paul
Thinking How to Live.Gibbard, Allan

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