Two Problems for Accepting as Intending

Ethics 128 (3):626-641 (2018)
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Abstract
It’s possible to accept or to reject a promise. According to a new proposal by Abraham Roth, accepting a promise involves intending that the promisee perform the promised action. According to Roth, this view is supported by rational symmetries between promissory acceptance and intention. Here, I show how these symmetries actually generate two problems for the view.
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Archival date: 2017-08-22
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