Conscious Action/Zombie Action

Noûs 50 (2):419-444 (2016)
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Abstract
I argue that the neural realizers of experiences of trying are not distinct from the neural realizers of actual trying . I then ask how experiences of trying might relate to the perceptual experiences one has while acting. First, I assess recent zombie action arguments regarding conscious visual experience, and I argue that contrary to what some have claimed, conscious visual experience plays a causal role for action control in some circumstances. Second, I propose a multimodal account of the experience of acting. According to this account, the experience of acting is a temporally extended, co-conscious collection of agentive and perceptual experiences, functionally integrated and structured both by multimodal perceptual processing as well as by what an agent is, at the time, trying to do.
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2016
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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References found in this work BETA
Intentionality.Searle, John
The Visual Brain in Action.Milner, A. David & Goodale, Melvyn A.
Beyond the Comparator Model: A Multi-Factorial Two-Step Account of Agency.Synofzik, Matthis; Vosgerau, Gottfried & Newen, Albert

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Citations of this work BETA
The Two-Visual-Systems Hypothesis and the Perspectival Features of Visual Experience.Foley, Robert T.; Whitwell, Robert L. & Goodale, Melvyn A.

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