Enigma of Personal Identity: What is it in virtue of which a person's younger self is identical to his later self?

Serican 1 (1):1-3 (2023)
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Abstract

In exploring personal identity, we are confronted with a perplexing dilemma: What is it in virtue of which a person's younger self is identical to his later self? Personal identity is a significant concept overarching philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and ethics (Glover, 1988). It provoked debates amongst countless philosophers regarding ideas about human existence, challenging our understanding of self-continuity and selfhood. This essay explores this philosophical problem to better understand ourselves and our interpretations. To build on the foundation of the contrasting insights of philosophers John Locke and David Hume, whose perspectives are examined through concepts of psychological continuity theory, bodily continuity theory, and narrative theory. By shifting the focus on the roots of identity, I reason that the root of a person's identity is their rational nature, defined as the capacity for reason, abstract thought, and self-reflection that mark human beings as persons. If rational nature has been lost, it is only until his social/narrative identity is lost that the person has completely lost their identity.

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