Hume's double standard of taste

Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52 (4):437-445 (1994)
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Abstract

I attempt to make sense of Hume's enigmatic characterization of the standard of taste as "a rule, by which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least, a decision, afforded, confirming one sentiment, and condemning another." In particular, I take up the questions (a) how the standard could be both a rule and a decision, (b) why it is at least a decision if not a rule, and (c) why, if a rule, it may reconcile various sentiments rather than merely confirm one and condemn another.

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James Shelley
Auburn University

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