Representation in Cognitive Science

Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Our thoughts are meaningful. We think about things in the outside world; how can that be so? This is one of the deepest questions in contemporary philosophy. Ever since the 'cognitive revolution', states with meaning-mental representations-have been the key explanatory construct of the cognitive sciences. But there is still no widely accepted theory of how mental representations get their meaning. Powerful new methods in cognitive neuroscience can now reveal information processing in the brain in unprecedented detail. They show how the brain performs complex calculations on neural representations. Drawing on this cutting-edge research, Nicholas Shea uses a series of case studies from the cognitive sciences to develop a naturalistic account of the nature of mental representation. His approach is distinctive in focusing firmly on the 'subpersonal' representations that pervade so much of cognitive science. The diversity and depth of the case studies, illustrated by numerous figures, make this book unlike any previous treatment. It is important reading for philosophers of psychology and philosophers of mind, and of considerable interest to researchers throughout the cognitive sciences.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SHERIC
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-09-27
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 155 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-09-27

Total downloads
87 ( #20,678 of 34,910 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
87 ( #3,349 of 34,910 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.