Truth as Composite Correspondence

In Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Springer Verlag. pp. 191-210 (2015)
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Abstract
The problem that motivates me arises from a constellation of factors pulling in different, sometimes opposing directions. Simplifying, they are: (1) The complexity of the world; (2) Humans’ ambitious project of theoretical knowledge of the world; (3) The severe limitations of humans’ cognitive capacities; (4) The considerable intricacy of humans’ cognitive capacities . Given these circumstances, the question arises whether a serious notion of truth is applicable to human theories of the world. In particular, I am interested in the questions: (a) Is a substantive standard of truth for human theories of the world possible? (b) What kind of standard would that be?
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Archival date: 2018-09-17
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