The folk psychological roots of free will

In David Rose (ed.), Experimental Metaphysics. Bloomsbury Academic (2017)
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Abstract
First, what are the psychological roots of our concept of free will? Second, how might progress on the first question contribute to progress regarding normative debates about the proper concept of free will? In sections two and three I address the first question. Section two discusses recent work in the experimental philosophy of free will, and motivates the study I report in section three. Section four reflects on the second question in light of the reported results. To preview, the results suggest that the psychological structure of our concept of free will is sensitive to three independent features: Liberty, Ensurance, and Consciousness. I argue this supports the view that our concept is incompatibilist more than the view that our concept is compatibilist, and I discuss two proposals regarding the normative upshot. On one proposal, these results might be taken to offer some support to incompatibilism about the proper concept. A second proposal, however, makes room for a much different upshot.
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Archival date: 2016-06-13
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Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Murray, Dylan & Nahmias, Eddy
The Lesson of Bypassing.Rose, David & Nichols, Shaun

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