A Primitive Solution to the Negation Problem

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):725-740 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
It has recently been alleged that expressivism cannot account for the obvious fact that normative sentences and their negations express inconsistent kinds of attitudes. I explain how the expressivist can respond to this objection. I offer an account of attitudinal inconsistency that takes it to be a combination of descriptive and normative relations. The account I offer to explain these relations relies on a combination of functionalism about normative judgments and expressivism about the norms governing them. It holds that the inconsistency of normative judgments is primitive. One potential problem for this view is that the large number of normative primitives that the expressivist will allegedly need to accept will render the view grossly unparsimonious. In defending this thesis, I suggest that it is a mistake to hold the lack of normative parsimony of expressivism against its core psychological claims.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SHIAPS
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-06-27
View other versions
Added to PP index
2015-12-16

Total views
287 ( #19,814 of 58,454 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
26 ( #29,262 of 58,454 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.