The Problem of Other Attitudes

American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):141-152 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Non-cognitivists are known to face a problem in extending their account of straightforward predicative moral judgments to logically complex moral judgments. This paper presents a related problem concerning how non-cognitivists might extend their accounts of moral judgments to other kinds of moral attitudes, such as moral hopes and moral intuitions. Non-cognitivists must solve three separate challenges: they must explain the natures of these other attitudes, they must explain why they count as moral attitudes, and they must explain why the moral attitudes are systematically correlated with ordinary propositional attitudes. After presenting the problem, this paper examines several contemporary theories with some initial promise for solving it, and argues that they are insufficient.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SHITPO-26
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-08-12
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Thinking How to Live.Gibbard, Allan
Impassioned Belief.Ridge, Michael

View all 19 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2017-11-25

Total views
24 ( #38,329 of 41,546 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #34,272 of 41,546 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.