Is There a True Metaphysics of Material Objects?

Noûs 36 (s1):118-145 (2002)
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I argue that metaphysical views of material objects should be understood as 'packages', rather than individual claims, where the other parts of the package include how the theory addresses 'recalcitant data', and that when the packages meet certain general desiderata - which all of the currently competing views *can* meet - there is nothing in the world that could make one of the theories true as opposed to any of the others.
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Four-Dimensionalism.Sider, Theodore
Brutal Composition.Markosian, Ned

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Ontological Realism.Sider, Theodore
Ontological Anti-Realism.Chalmers, David J.

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