The criminalist's paradox as a counterexample to the principle of total evidence

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (2025)
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Abstract

The principle of total evidence says that all relevant information should be considered when making an inference about a hypothesis. In this article, we argue that the criminalist’s paradox from the literature on the methodology of forensic science constitutes a counterexample against the principle of total evidence. The paradox arises, for example, when a forensic scientist uses the results from other forensic procedures to inform their own analysis. In such cases, their results can become more reliable, but at the same time also dependent on those other forensic results and therefore less useful for decisions in court cases. Consequently, such influences are generally avoided in forensic science. We argue that structurally similar problems plague also other scientific disciplines, anticipate an objection to the counterexample, and propose two new versions of the principle of total evidence that do not fall prey to the criminalist’s paradox.

Author Profiles

Michał Sikorski
Marche Polytechnic University
Alexander Gebharter
Marche Polytechnic University

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