On The Conceivability of Zombies

In Jack Copeland (ed.), Philosophy research paper series - Dept Philosophy, University of Canterbury (1998)
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In this paper I begin by explaining the concept of supervenience. I then describe the problem of qualia and explain why qualia are a problem for physicalist theories of the mind. Next, I outline the zombie argument and explain Chalmers' attempt to use it as an argument for the conclusion that qualia do not logically supervene on the physical. My goal is to show that the supposed conceivability of zombies does not offer any serious refutation of physicalist theories of the mind.
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