The deduction paradox

Abstract

Two definitions of deduction are offered. The first is that deduction is an inference type that is both possibly valid and possibly invalid. No inference can satisfy this definition, because valid inferences are not possibly invalid and invalid inferences are not possibly valid. In the second definition, deduction is understood as an inference that aims for validity. This definition also has unwanted consequences, including the fact that invalid inferences are only deductive when they are thought to be possibly valid. If the only genuine deductions are the valid ones, then our talk about deduction is an indirect and thoughtless way of referring to valid inferences rather than to an inference type. There is simply no deduction to speak off. Only valid inferences.

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2024-10-04

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