Können wir uns dazu entscheiden, etwas zu glauben?

Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (4):583-592 (2016)
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Abstract

In this essay the author argues that, in a restricted sense, we can decide to believe certain propositions. It is conceded that acquiring a belief is not a basic action and possibly not even an action at all. However, this does not entail the impossibility of decisions to believe since not everything we can decide to do is a basic action. In fact, we can often decide to be in a certain state of affairs. Although beliefs normally aim at truth, there are cases in which we can voluntarily seek or avoid irrational states of affairs and thereby influence our attitudes. Bearing this in mind, situations in which we can talk of decisions to belief can be construed easily.

Author's Profile

Simon Walgenbach
University of St. Andrews

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