Don’t forget forgetting: the social epistemic importance of how we forget

Synthese 198 (6):5373-5394 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
We motivate a picture of social epistemology that sees forgetting as subject to epistemic evaluation. Using computer simulations of a simple agent-based model, we show that how agents forget can have as large an impact on group epistemic outcomes as how they share information. But, how we forget, unlike how we form beliefs, isn’t typically taken to be the sort of thing that can be epistemically rational or justified. We consider what we take to be the most promising argument for this claim and find it lacking. We conclude that understanding how agents forget should be as central to social epistemology as understanding how agents form beliefs and share information with others.
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SINDFF-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-03-19
View other versions
Added to PP index
2021-03-19

Total views
115 ( #44,325 of 65,695 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
60 ( #13,441 of 65,695 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.