Expressivism and the Value of Truth

Philosophia 40 (4):877-883 (2012)
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Abstract
This paper is a reply to Michael Lynch's "Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research for 2009. It argues that Lynch's argument against expressivism fails because of an ambiguity in the employed notion of an 'epistemically disengaged standpoint'.
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 2 (2015-11-21)
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Thinking How to Live.Gibbard, Allan
Toward Fin de Siècle Ethics: Some Trends.Darwall, Stephen; Gibbard, Allan & Railton, Peter

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