Expressivism and the Value of Truth
Philosophia 40 (4):877-883 (2012)
Abstract
This paper is a reply to Michael Lynch's "Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research for 2009. It argues that Lynch's argument against expressivism fails because of an ambiguity in the employed notion of an 'epistemically disengaged standpoint'.
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References found in this work BETA
Thinking How to Live.Gibbard, Allan
Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.Blackburn, Simon
Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It.Dworkin, Ronald
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Citations of this work BETA
Le quasi-réalisme et l’argument de la coïncidence.Rocheleau-Houle, David
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2011-08-18
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57 ( #7,309 of 39,015 )
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