Expressivist Explanations

Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):147-177 (2012)
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Abstract
In this paper I argue that the common practice of employing moral predicates as explaining phrases can be accommodated on an expressivist account of moral practice. This account does not treat moral explanations as in any way second-rate or derivative, since it subsumes moral explanations under the general theory of program explanations (as defended by Jackson and Pettit). It follows that the phenomenon of moral explanations cannot be used to adjudicate the debate between expressivism and its rivals
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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2012-04-03

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