Considering Dispositional Moral Realism

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Abstract
My aim in this paper is to consider a series of arguments against Dispositional Moral Realism, and argue that these objections are unsuccessful. I will consider arguments that try to either establish a dis-analogy between moral properties and secondary qualities, or try to show that a dispositional account of moral properties fails to account for what a defensible species of moral realism must account for. I also consider criticisms from Simon Blackburn (1993), who argues that there could not be a corresponding perceptual faculty for moral properties, and David Enoch (2011), who argues that Dispositional Moral Realism does not most plausibly explain the difference between moral disagreements and disagreements of mere preference. Finally, I examine a novel criticism concerning the relationship between the diverse variety of moral properties and the range of our normative affective attitudes, arguing that the view has no problem accounting for this diversity.
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Archival date: 2019-08-07
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References found in this work BETA
Moral Realism: A Defence.Shafer-Landau, Russ
Mind, Value, and Reality.McDowell, John Henry

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