One‐Person Moral Twin Earth Cases

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):16-22 (2019)
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This paper presents two cases demonstrating that theories allowing the environment to partially determine the content of moral concepts provide incorrect truth-conditions for moral terms. While typical Moral Twin Earth cases seek to establish that these theories fail to account formoral disagreement, neither case here essentially involves interpersonal disagreement. Both involve a single person retaining moral beliefs despite recognizing actual or potential mismatches with the purportedly content-determining facts. This lets opponents of such theories grant objections that standard Moral Twin Earth cases fail to demonstrate disagreement, and argue more straightforwardly that they generate implausible truth-conditions for moral claims.

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Neil Sinhababu
National University of Singapore


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