Rational epistemic akrasia for the ambivalent pragmatist

In Dimitria Electra Gatzia & Berit Brogaard (eds.), Being of Two Minds: The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence (2021)
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Abstract
Epistemic akrasia can be rational. I consider a lonely pragmatist who believes that her imaginary friend doesn’t exist, and also believes on pragmatic grounds that she should believe in him. She rationally believes that her imaginary friend doesn’t exist, rationally follows various sources of evidence to the view that she should believe in him to end her loneliness, and rationally holds these attitudes simultaneously. Evidentialism suggests that her ambivalent epistemic state is rational, as considerations grounded in the value of truth justify her beliefs.
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