The Desire‐Belief Account of Intention Explains Everything

Noûs 47 (4):680-696 (2013)
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Abstract
I argue that one intends that ϕ if one has a desire that ϕ and an appropriately related means-end belief. Opponents, including Setiya and Bratman, charge that this view can't explain three things. First, intentional action is accompanied by knowledge of what we are doing. Second, we can choose our reasons for action. Third, forming an intention settles a deliberative question about what to do, disposing us to cease deliberating about it. I show how the desire- belief view can explain why these phenomena occur when they occur, and why they don't when they don't
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